murder charge. 3 Thus paragraph five of the state's 'summary of substantial facts' read as follows: 'The accused said to witnesses on the scene, that he thought she was an intruder.
Even then, the accused shot with the direct intention to kill a person. An error in persona,
will not affect, the intention to kill a human being'. 4 In their Heads of Argument at the trials closing the state also included an alternative based on dolus eventualis:
5
'Even in the event that the court were to accept the accused's version, it is submitted with respect that he cannot escape a finding that he acted with dolus eventualis by arming himself and, whilst approaching the "danger", foresaw the possibility that he may shoot and kill someone but reconciled himself with this possibility by walking into the bathroom and then without objective or subjective cause, fired four shots into a small toilet cubicle whilst anticipating that someone was in the cubicle and likely to be killed'. 6 Whether Judge Masipa's verdict was based on an interpretation of law or an evaluation of the facts and if the former, whether her interpretation of the law was faulty, remains to be seen.
This will be the subject of the pending appeal and the Supreme Court of Appeal will decisively settle the matter. Nonetheless, the time is ripe to evaluate error in objecto in order to understand its place in the broader scheme of South African criminal law. This article will thus consider error in objecto in light of the two most critical shifts in our law on mens rea in an attempt to provide a holistic understanding of the principle: the move towards a subjective test for dolus; and the recognition of knowledge of unlawfulness as a component of mens rea.
It will be shown that any potential role that error in objecto may have in South African criminal law is contingent on recognising the centrality of mens rea and a subjective enquiry into intention.
THE MOVE TOWARDS A SUBJECTIVE TEST FOR DOLUS
Jurisdictions can broadly be divided into two approach categories with regard to assessing fault: psychological systems of fault; 7 and normative systems of fault. 8 Psychological approaches to fault predominantly entail subjective assessments while normative approaches to fault generally entail objective assessments. 9 South Africa predominantly follows a psychological system of fault. It is now trite that intention is subjectively assessed in South
African criminal law, that dolus eventualis is the most commonly used form of intention and that the central position of mens rea in our law has received constitutional recognition. 10 Nonetheless, despite the firmness with which these propositions are now entrenched in South African criminal law, they are in fact products of relatively recent developments in our law that have taken place over approximately the last 60 years. It was only from the 1950's that South African courts began to consistently apply the psychological theory of fault, basing criminal liability primarily on subjectively assessed intention. In fact, the entire element of mens rea has not always held the central position in law that it does today. For the purposes of criminal liability, early Roman, Germanic and English law was far more concerned with a consummated deed than with culpability. Thus a person who caused the death of another was criminally liable for the death caused by his conduct irrespective of his intention or negligence: 12 'As late as the 15 th century a Hollander who killed a human being by mere accident or in self-defence forfeited life and limb according to the law and could rely upon the absence of dolus only as a mitigating circumstance upon the strength of which the Sovereign or the court could extend clemency'. 13 However, as the concept of mens rea grew in centrality in the criminal law, means had to be developed to grow the reach of intention beyond its literal meaning. If only a literal or colloquial understanding of intention were to apply in criminal law liability would be confined to results that the actor desired to bring about, those results that were the actor's aim and object: 'This suggested that which could be foreseen as a consequence of an act, but which was not desired, was not intended'.
14 This approach to intention would leave the law unduly narrow, excluding blameworthy individuals from criminal liability. It was unfair in that it could result in punishment of individuals who did not actually possess intention -the adoption of a purely subjective test for intention is more in keeping with the dictates of justice. 17 This is due to the fact that a subjective enquiry avoids courts imputing criminal intention onto an accused who in fact lacks such intention, or at least foresight. This process of imputation is often referred to as 'constructive' intent and arguably leads to artificiality within the law, thereby undermining the project of fair labelling that is central to criminal law.
18
The presumption of intention was also unprincipled in that it blurred the boundaries between the normative enquiry into negligence and the psychological enquiry into intention.
19
This in turn blurred the lines between murder and culpable homicide -after all, the only distinguishing feature in the definitions of these crimes is mens rea, that is intention and negligence.
Clearly the presumption of intention was also inter-woven with the now-defunct doctrines of versari and transferred malice. South Africa the mens rea required for a conviction of murder is intention to kill, as the consequence the crime prohibits is death. In light of this, the court in Pistorius was correct when noting that 'the intention to shoot… does not necessarily include the intention to kill'
44
-foresight of bodily injury short of death will not suffice for a charge of murder.
This is unlike English law, which transgresses the principle of correspondence, as either intention to kill or intention to cause grievous bodily harm is sufficient to sustain a charge of murder. 45 English law is built on the basis of 'sufficient similarity' 46 between the perpetrator's intention and the actual result. The focus is placed on the result caused accompanied by intention, rather than the specific or subjective nature of that intention. This 40 See S v Coetzee supra (n10) where O'Regan J stated at para 177 that dolus eventualis has 'been recognised as sufficient to meet the requirement of culpability [in our law]'. The same passage was relied upon by Moseneke J in S v Thebus supra (n10) at para 20 who said the following with regard to the legal limits of common purpose liability by active association: '… he must have intended them to be killed, or he must have foreseen the possibility of their being killed and performed his own act of association with recklessness as to whether or not death was to ensue', thus approving the definition of dolus eventualis. Masingili supra (n10) 52 It seems to be a much more natural fit in the context of direct intent, where it is my aim and object to kill X (I intended to kill the body I was aiming at). In fact, all of the descriptions of error in objecto appear to be written in language suggesting or describing direct intent. For example, Ormerod provides the following example: 'D intends to murder X and, in the dusk, shoots at a man whom he believes to be X. He hits and kills the man at whom he aims, who is in fact V'. 53 According to Milton, '[I]n the case of error in objecto A's mens rea is directed at a specific predetermined individual, although he is in error as to the exact identity of that individual. In other words, he intends to kill the individual regardless of whether the name of the individual is B or C'.
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Limiting error in objecto to dolus directus would narrow the scope of the criminal law in this context. Considering the scope of the criminal law ultimately determines the extent to which the state uses its coercive power to interfere with the civil liberties of citizens, it may be preferable to restrict such a principle to direct intent. But before any principle is capable of application its exact nature must be ascertained. In this regard, it is useful to examine cases in which it has been discussed. 'But in the first place indeed it makes little difference with this Cornelian law as to assassins whether a person kills the man whom he had designed to kill, or on the other hand kills another in mistake. This is so whether he makes a mistake as to the person, as when he thinks it is Titius, and he had formed the purpose to kill Titius, though it was really Maevius: or a wounding blow aimed at Titius, but parried by him has been the destruction of Maevius who was standing close by; or lastly a man is killed who had thrust himself midway between attacker and defender with the object of preventing the killing. This is because the main act carries most weight, and such a mistake does away neither with the intention to kill, nor with the avenging of the killing by the Cornelian law.' 57 (my emphasis)
'Our next task is to decide what should be said if an attempt has produced a murder but the person whom the murderer intended to kill was not killed. For example, Sempronius kills Maevius by error when he wishes to kill Titius. Should he be more leniently punished as if absolved of or not apart from the result of the crime? It is more right that he should not, for it is contrary to morality and general custom that the capital punishment be not imposed. Certainly Sempronius had the intention to kill and he killed, although not the man he desired. Custom requires a consummated crime. This is a complete crime, albeit against another person. On the contrary the evidence shows that from the onset the accused believed that, at the time he fired shots into the toilet door, the deceased was in the bedroom while the intruders were in the toilet.'
This adheres to a subjective approach to intention where, if the facts and evidence suggests that an accused did not foresee the death of the victim they cannot be held to intend that victim's death, even in cases of indeterminatus. 67 If the accused had excluded the possibility that the victim could be killed to apply error in objecto here would be to transfer his subjective foresight from the death of the supposed victim to the death of the actual victim.
This accords with the defence contention in the Pistorius matter that recognising error in objecto would in fact amount to transferred intent, which has been rejected in South African law.
The earlier review of South African authorities that mention error in objecto in the same vein as aberratio ictus further supports the classification of error in objecto as a form of transferred malice. Equally, finding an accused has intention in cases where they had subjectively excluded the possibility of the death of the actual victim would signal a return to results based liability -holding someone liable for the result of their conduct even where the evidence suggests there was no subjective foresight.
Nonetheless, even if in theory error in objecto is distinct from aberratio ictus, does not rely on transferred malice and irrespective of whether it applies beyond direct intent, one question remains. Considering that error in objecto only exists in textbooks and a handful of obiter dicta -what is the legal status of error in objecto?
In considering this it is instructive to go back to the previously mentioned cases on aberratio ictus, which either implicitly or explicitly included error in objecto in their discussions. They were eventually overruled when aberratio ictus was finally dispensed with from our law. 69 The The above statement was made not only in reference to aberratio ictus but rather with regard to criminal liability generally. It thus applies equally to error in objecto and in fact all other principles of criminal law. Therefore, if an accused shoots at and kills X thinking X is Y, he cannot be convicted unless he subjectively foresaw the possibility of killing X.
Furthermore, in Raisa, Flemming J provided the following additional ground to explain the rejection of the aberratio ictus rule from South African criminal law:
'There is no reason to think that the aberratio ictus rule received any wider recognition than the versari in re illicita doctrine. If the ratio of the decision in S v Van der Mescht (supra) encompassed that the versari in re illicita doctrine had to yield to the basic principles of criminal law because it had not gained such wide recognition as to become an entrenched principle of the law, the ratio would apply equally to the aberratio ictus rule'.
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The term 'aberratio ictus' in the above quote could just as well be swapped for the term error in objecto. The same line of reasoning applies to error in objecto except, unlike aberratio ictus and versari, no reported case I could find has been decided on the basis of error in objecto. It is either the subject of textbooks or lumped into the same discussion in aberratio ictus cases. It would thus be fair to say, to echo the above quote, that it 'has not gained such wide recognition as to become an entrenched principle of law' and must therefore 'yield to the basic principles of criminal law'.
In other words, an error in objecto will only result in a finding of intention to kill where as a matter of fact, proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused at least subjectively foresaw the possibility of killing the deceased and proceeded, reckless to that possibility. 'We are clearly dealing with error in objecto or error in persona, in that the blow was meant for the person behind the toilet door, who the accused believed was an intruder. The blow struck and killed the person behind the door. The fact that the person behind the door turned out to be the deceased and not an intruder, is irrelevant.
The starting point however, once more is whether the accused had the intention to kill the person behind the toilet door whom he mistook for an intruder.' accused genuinely and mistakenly believes they are under attack 86 and/or 2) where the accused genuinely but mistaken believes their response to an attack is proportional. 87 Either of these circumstances would support a putative defence and thus negate intention.
Nonetheless, many commentators at the time felt that the court in De Blom went too far with subjectivity, believing that only reasonable mistakes of the law should negate liability. 88 The criticisms expressed can broadly be described as floodgates arguments -that the court's finding would open the floodgates of unwarranted acquittals. 89 For example, it was noted that most crimes require intention and have no competent verdict based on negligence. 90 Thus in the majority of cases a genuine mistake regarding lawfulness, even when that mistake was unreasonably held, will result in a complete acquittal. Furthermore, it was argued that while the decision in De Blom may be theoretically acceptable it would be impossible to apply in practice -courts would not be able to adjudicate such matters with sufficient certainty and prosecutors would not be able to refute spurious claims. 91 It is clear with the benefit of hindsight that the fear of the floodgates opening did not materialise. 92 As Dlamini pointed out in his ten year review of De Blom, 'despite the demise of the ignorantia iuris rule, the criminal justice system has not collapsed as was feared by its supporters'. 93 First, many cases in which the putative defence is raised involve a killing, where culpable homicide is a competent verdict on a murder charge. Thus the law is robust enough to catch these cases in the net of liability while arguably more fully adhering to the principle of fair-labelling. Where a person is negligent, falling short of the standard of the reasonable person, and someone dies as a result, the appropriate label to attach is that of culpable homicide. The discretionary sentencing attached to this conviction leaves adequate room for the individual blameworthiness of the offender to be reflected.
A second reason that the floodgates have not opened is the process of inferential reasoning followed by the courts. Where an accused claims to have lacked knowledge of unlawfulness and such a claim is patently unreasonable it is more likely that the state will be found to have satisfied their burden of proof, that the only reasonable inference to draw from the facts is that the accused in fact possessed knowledge of unlawfulness: 'the process of establishing actual subjective foresight invariably involves the drawing of conclusions founded on objective probabilities based on general human experience'.
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Before a court will accept that doubt has been cast on knowledge of unlawfulness a significant evidential burden will need to be discharged by the accused in order to provide the court with an evidential basis on which to find that their claim of lack of knowledge of unlawfulness could reasonably possibly be true. Experience has proven that the genuineness of claims of mistakes of law is capable of assessment by reference to the surrounding circumstances:
95 ' [C]ommon sense dictates that the process of inferential reasoning may start out from the premise that, in accordance with common human experience, the possibility of the consequences that ensued would 93 C R M Dlamini 'In defence of the defence of ignorance of law' (1989) 2 SACJ 14. 94 S Hoctor op cit (n36) 132, 154. 95 Contrary to the fears expressed by R C Whiting op cit (n83) 7. See P Carstens op cit (n33) 73: 'Such a finding, however, will be dependent on the proven facts of each case and a good measure of inferential reasoning'.
have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence. The next logical step would be to ask whether, in the light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, there is any reason to think that the appellant would not have shared this foresight, derived from common human experience, with other members of the general population.'
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The court's reasoning in De Blom itself illustrates this. 97 One of the charges faced by De
Blom was contravening the Exchange Control Regulations at the time by taking foreign currency out of the country above the value permitted by law and without seeking the necessary permission to do so. De Blom claimed she did not know the law required her to seek permission. On reviewing the evidence as a whole this argument failed on the facts. The court noted that De Blom was experienced in money matters and foreign travel and had taken the trouble to hide the dollar notes. The Appellate Division was satisfied that the only reasonable inference to draw on the facts was that she indeed had the knowledge of unlawfulness.
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South Africa may be alone in following a consistently subjective approach to knowledge of unlawfulness but it is not alone in recognising a subjective approach to putative private defence specifically. The British Court of Appeal adopted a subjective approach to mistaken belief in self-defence in Gladstone Williams, 99 which was endorsed by the Privy Council in Beckford. 100 The matter has since been decisively settled by s 76(4) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 adopting a subjective approach to the matter. This concern is forcefully criticised by Ormerod, quoting Dixon J, who eloquently expresses the imperative of a subjective approach to intention:
The difficulty of distinguishing between "he foresaw" and "he ought to have foreseen", "he knew" and "he ought to have known", is not a good reason for not drawing the line at this point. It is an inescapable difficulty when we have a law which requires us to look into individual's minds; and such a requirement is essential to a civilised system of criminal law. "[A] lack of confidence in the ability of a tribunal correctly to estimate evidence of states of mind and the like can never be sufficient ground for excluding from enquiry the most fundamental element in a rational and humane criminal code"'.
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The piece-meal approach followed in England obfuscates the law and is lacking in principle:
' Since error in objecto pre-dates the developments in De Blom (and possibly only applies to dolus directus) it can be assumed that error in objecto targets the left side of the diagram above. In other words, error in objecto says that where you do not meet a definition of intention due to mistaking the identity of your victim the law will treat you as if you meet the definition of intention -a mistake as to the identity of your victim will not provide a defence to intention.
Conversely, a putative defence impacts the right hand side of the diagram in that it negates knowledge of unlawfulness. In other words, putative private defence says that I genuinely believed I was acting in lawful self-defence thus I lacked knowledge of the unlawfulness of my conduct.
rules speak at cross-purposes, irrespective of any error in objecto, if the facts of a case support a finding of putative defence an acquittal will result.
THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM'S IDENTITY IN A CHARGE OF MURDER
As both putative private defence and error in objecto raise the issue of the identity of the victim it is pertinent to consider the role of the identity of the victim in a murder charge more broadly. Despite the definition of murder referring to 'the unlawful, intentional killing of another human being' (emphasis added) the identity of the deceased is still relevant to some extent to a charge of murder. himself with that possibility'. 113 The grammatical use of the definite article in this definition clearly infers the identity of the actual victim not any hypothetical victim.
Secondly, if identity were never relevant dolus indeterminatus would be rendered superfluous. Surely the very distinction between indeterminatus and the other varieties of dolus is that in their regular form they relate to a specific victim whereas in their indeterminatus variety they relate to any possible victim? It is useful to briefly consider the definitions of dolus to illustrate this point. would be killed and proceeded to shoot, reckless to that possibility (dolus eventualis).
Indeterminatus exists where the perpetrator does not have a particular victim in mind, but they intend to kill someone. 119 Finally, in considering the relevance of the victim's identity in a charge of murder it is necessary to distinguish between an abstract prohibition (the definition of the crime) and the concrete charge:
'…it is possible to distinguish between two levels, that of the prohibition in general -the norm -and that of imputing the prohibition to an actor -the charging. While on the general level we can, and should view the prohibition in the abstract terms of the elements of the offence, that is not the case in regards to charging and punishing a person for the commission of an offence. Criminal liability is imputed to a person for a concrete offence committed in the real world, and not for an abstraction. A defendant is put on trial for a concrete act'.
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'Mens rea must relate to the concrete object of the offence. When an actor is not aware that his conduct may injure the concrete object of the offence that is actually harmed, that harm cannot In the rare situation where the accused has subjectively excluded the possibility that their actual victim may suffer the consequence of the crime they cannot be convicted of that crime as they lack intention regarding that victim. 122 Convicting them of the crime would be transferring their intention from the intended victim/s onto the actual victim. The law would be fictitiously treating the offender as if he had foreseen the consequence in question when as a matter of fact, in the circumstances, the offender had not subjectively foreseen the consequence. This would be reintroducing the doctrine of transferred malice into South African law.
So, to use an extreme example by way of illustration, if X intends to kill civilians by blowing up a shopping centre it does not matter that X does not know the identity of the victims who end up dying in the blast. X had dolus directus indeterminatus -it was his aim and object to kill whoever was in the shopping centre -he has intention to satisfy a conviction of murder. If, however, X knows that his mother frequents the shopping centre but believes her to be in bed sleeping when he sets the bomb off he subjectively excludes the possibility of killing his mother.
If, unbeknown to him his mother had woken up earlier and gone to the shopping centre and was killed in the blast, he cannot be convicted of her murder. It was not his aim and object to kill her and he did not subjectively foresee the possibility of her death and proceed reckless. In fact, in this example he subjectively eliminates the possibility of her death thus cannot be said to reconcile himself with this possibility. He does not have dolus eventualis regarding her death thus to convict him would be constructively treating him as if he had intention, when in fact he did not. He should have foreseen the possibility of her death thus he is negligent and can be convicted of culpable homicide. Furthermore, he had dolus 122 See K Ghanayim, M Kremnitzer op cit (n27) 12: 'Where the actor does not take into account the possibility that his conduct may harm the actual object, we cannot impute mens rea to harm the actual object'.
directus indeterminatus regarding the deaths of the other shoppers therefore he can be convicted of their murders.
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Thus it is clear that despite the definition of murder being framed in reference to killing 'a human being' the identity of the victim still retains relevance in determining criminal liability. This is all the more pertinent in jurisdictions like South Africa that follow a subjective approach to determining intention, which enhances fair labelling, embodies individual autonomy and has received constitutional endorsement.
CONCLUSION
This article sought to reconcile the historical principle of error in objecto in the broader context of the modern legal terrain in which it exists. Arguably the court in Pistorius also implicitly achieves this, though insufficient reasoning was provided. This is especially clear when reviewing the court's concluding paragraphs on the murder charge. Having spent the earlier portion of the judgment reviewing the various arguments and evidence placed before the court, Masipa J concludes the following:
'From the above it cannot be said that the accused did not entertain a genuine belief that there was an intruder in the toilet, who posed a threat to him. Therefore he could not be found guilty of murder dolus directus…'
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This proceeds from the premise that if there had been evidence to support a finding of dolus directus indeterminatus regarding a supposed intruder an acquittal would still result. This is because, regardless of the error in objecto, the putative defence remains because it is broader than error in objecto and therefore unaffected by it. Knowledge of unlawfulness is required for a murder conviction, which is lacking in the case of a putative defence. 123 This reasoning explains why the accused in Pistorius could not have been convicted on the basis of dolus indeterminatus, as the court had accepted his evidence that he mistakenly believed Steenkamp was in the bedroom at the time of the shooting -he had subjectively excluded her death as a possibility. 124 State v Pistorius supra (n1) at 3347.
be sufficient surrounding evidence to support a claim that an accused had subjectively excluded the possibility of their particular victim's death. The court will not simply take the accused's version at face value -a significant evidential burden will need to be met to convince the court to draw this inference. But where the surrounding evidence suggests that the accused had genuinely excluded the possibility of the victim's death, there cannot be a finding of intention when applying a subjective test. Such a finding would be a legal fiction on the facts.
Criminal law is a complex ecosystem -no principle can be fully understood without considering how it impacts, or is impacted by, the principles surrounding it. Furthermore, criminal law is not static and develops and progresses through time -ancient principles must be re-evaluated in light of modern developments. Two of the most critical modern developments in our law regarding mens rea are: the adoption of a subjective approach to Arguably, considering the above analysis, this was achieved by the court in S v Pistorius, though unfortunately explicit reasoning was not provided in the judgment. Error in objecto was applied in a manner that gave primacy to the pivotal status of mens rea and adhered to a subjective approach to intention, which best encapsulates and enhances individual autonomy and fair labelling in our law. The court's finding in the Pistorius matter might be unpopular but reviewing the developments in the law on mens rea over the past 60 127 De Blom supra (n83).
years shows the decision is in keeping with a consistent application of the current law. The rule of law must always persevere, even in the face of an unpopular verdict.
